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FLOOD INSURANCE IS NOT ALL CREATED EQUAL
CRAIG M. COLUINS
Some residents of areas affected by floods will be fortunate enough
to have flood insurance-either because they were forced to buy it to get
financing, or because life had taught them that floods are a recurring
phenomenon. If their claims are not paid in full, however, these insureds
may learn that litigation arising from a flood insurance policy differs
from lawsuits over ordinary insurance. Also, not all flood insurance
policies are created equal.
I. FEDERAL INSURANCE POLICIES
Most flood insurance is issued under the National Flood Insurance
Act, which was adopted in 1968 because private insurers had stopped
covering floods except at exorbitant premiums. Now, flood insurance
can be issued either by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) or by a private insurer, but in either case, it is governed by
federal law, whereas other types of homeowner's insurance are governed
by state law. Private insurers that have authority to issue federal flood
insurance are known as Write Your Own (WYO) insurers.1 Policies
issued by WYO insurers are fully reinsured by FEMA.
The premiums and language are substantively identical in both
FEMA and WYO federal flood policies. In fact, the language of the
standard policy is dictated by the Code of Federal Regulations. 2 No
provision of the policy may be altered, varied, or waived other than by
an endorsement approved by FEMA.3 Still, homeowners who have the
stamina to withstand the onslaught of procedural requirements can some-
times fare better with one of the standard policies issued by a WYO
insurer than with a policy issued directly by FEMA.
II. FEDERAL FLOOD POLICIES
Damages from flood and mudflow usually are not covered by
standard homeowner's insurance policies. 4 Therefore, people affected
by these disasters will look to their flood insurance policies, which
1. 44 C.F.R. § 62(c) & App. B (1997).
2. 44 C.F.R. § 59.
3. 44 C.F.R. § 61.13(d).
4. This is subject to an important exception, however, when a mudflow (which is not covered) is
predominantly caused by fire (which is covered). See, e.g., Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267
Cal. Rptr. 708, 717 (1990).
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substantively cover flood and mudflow losses. Yet technical traps in the
law of flood insurance can leave unwary homeowners with less coverage
than they expected-or no coverage at all.
Lawsuits under federal flood policies-whether issued by FEMA or
WYO insurers-are different from other insurance litigation because
federal law governs 5 and because the lawsuits must be filed in federal
court, 6 whereas litigation over other homeowner's insurance is typically
filed in state courts. A number of problems confront the plaintiff-
insured when federal law governs. Generally speaking, federal law is not
as generous as state law in making allowances for the average policy-
holder's lack of sophistication and bargaining power in dealing with
insurers, and his or her lack of savvy about insurance law issues. Federal
law holds insureds to a standard of strict compliance with the policy
terms. State law generally is not so strict.
This difference can be seen in the way courts have dealt with the
standard requirement that a policyholder must file a proof of flood loss
within sixty days after the loss in order to make a claim.7 The two prob-
lems that generally arise with proofs of loss are that the policyholder
either misses the deadline or understates the damages. 8
While other types of homeowner's policies require a proof of loss,
some courts have held that it would be unfair to strictly enforce this
requirement: state courts have applied the "notice-prejudice rule,"
which holds that even a policyholder who gives late notice has
sufficiently fulfilled its obligation, unless the insurer suffered some form
of prejudice because the notice was late. 9 But federal courts generally
have been stricter in enforcing the sixty-day limit.
An issue arises about whether these rules of "strict compliance"
with policy terms apply to flood insurance that is issued by WYO insur-
ers. A recent case from the Ninth Circuit, involving a different type of
federal insurance program, suggests by analogy that the same
pro-insurer rules would apply to owners of WYO flood policies as to
other types of homeowner's insurance. 10
5. Brazil v. Giuffrida, 763 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing West v. Harris, 573 F.2d 873,
881 (5th Cir. 1978)).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4053 (1994).
7. See, e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 61, App. A(I), art. 9 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Phelps v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 18-19 (Ist Cir.
1986) (holding that failure to provide a written proof of loss, absent a waiver by FEMA, prevents
recovery); West Augusta Development Corp. v. Guiffrida, 717 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1983) (allow-
ing FEMA to deny coverage under flood policy for insured's failure to file timely proof of loss); Bul-
lard v. Connor, 716 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (N.D. !11. 1989) (stating that FEMA had not waived the flood
policy requirement that the insured sign proof of loss form within 60 days after damage occurred).
9. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, § 12.06 at 12-20 (Matthew Bender 1993).
10. See Seattle Fur Exchange v. Foreign Credit Ins. Ass'n, 7 F.3d 158 (9th Cir. 1983).
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In Seattle Fur Exchange v. Foreign Credit Insurance AssociationI I
a fur exporter purchased insurance against defaults by foreign buyers
from a consortium of private insurers known as the Foreign Credit
Insurance Association (FCIA).12 The policy was fully reinsured by a
federal agency known as Eximbank. 13
The fur exporter made a claim and FCIA denied it, saying that
because of some procedural defects in the claim, the exporter had not
strictly complied with the terms of the policy and thus had failed to
invoke coverage. 14 The fur exporter argued that FCIA, a consortium of
private entities, did not enjoy the right reserved to the government to
insist on "strict compliance" with the terms of the policy. 15 Rather, the
traditional rules of equitable estoppel (which would have required FCIA
to show some prejudice from the procedural defects) applied.1 6 The
issue was whether the court would apply the pro-insured rules of inter-
pretation typically used in private insurance cases or those of "strict
compliance" normally used in cases against the government.17
Distinguishing a number of federal decisions endorsing the fur ex-
porter's position, the court found one fact crucial: that even though the
policy was issued by private insurers, Eximbank was the reinsurer. 18
This created a "direct contractual link" between the insured and the
government, and thus the rules of strict compliance prevailed.19
Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of FCIA.20
The standard flood insurance policy also states that it is fully rein-
sured by FEMA. Thus, even a WYO insurer might have the right to insist
on "strict compliance" with the terms of the policy. A homeowner who
fails to file any proof of loss within sixty days probably will be out of
luck.
III. PROOF OF LOSS
The law is less clear, however, when the homeowner gives timely
notice but understates the amount of damages. As a way of defeating
11. 7 F.3d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1993).
12. Seattle Fur Exch. v. Foreign Credit Ins. Ass'n, 7 F.3d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1993).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 159-60.
15. Id. at 161.
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 161-62.
18. Id. at 161-63.
19. Id. at 163.
20. Id.
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claims for more than the amount stated in the initial proof of loss, FEMA
has concocted an argument which, like that in Seattle Fur Exchange,
would not arise with other types of private insurance. This argument
depends on an ambiguity in the statute that created the flood insurance
program.
FEMA argues that the federal district court, by statute, only has juris-
diction to hear a lawsuit after a claim has been disallowed. 21 Thus, if the
homeowner did not claim the full amount of his or her damages in the
proof of loss, regardless of the frequent difficulty of determining this in
the allotted sixty days, then the portion of the policy benefits not timely
claimed could not have been "disallowed." 22 Since FEMA cannot dis-
allow a claim that has not been made, the federal district court in this
situation does not have jurisdiction to hear the homeowner's case. 23
At least one court has rejected this argument, holding that a defec-
tive flood insurance proof of loss does not necessarily deprive the court
of jurisdiction to hear a case. 24 Another federal court has shown some
leniency in dealing with the issue, holding that a policyholder who
submits a timely proof of loss will be allowed to later seek a larger dollar
amount of benefits than was claimed in the proof of loss-unless the
flood insurer can show that the policyholder should be estopped from
doing S0.25
In Criger v. Becton,26 a flood insurance policyholder signed a claim
seeking $3,721.06.27 FEMA argued that Criger could not recover any
more than this amount at trial.28 The court ruled that this was essentially
an equitable estoppel claim by FEMA.29 FEMA had the burden to prove
the elements of estoppel. 30
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (1994).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Reeves v. Giuffrida, 756 F.2d 1141, 1142 (5th Cir. 1985).
25. See Criger v. Becton, 702 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
26. 702 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
27. Criger v. Becton, 702 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. Mo. 1988), reversed on unrelated grounds, 902
F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1990).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 765-66.
30. The court stated:
In essence, defendant argues that plaintiff is equitably estopped from asserting that his
claim exceeds $3,721.06. To establish estoppel, defendant must demonstrate the
following:
(1) The party to be estopped knew the facts;
(2) The party to be estopped intended that his conduct be relied upon, or acted in a
manner to justify such reliance;
(3) The party asserting estoppel was ignorant of the facts; and
(4) The party asserting estoppel reasonably relied on the other's conduct and was
substantially injured as a result. Bell v. O'Leary, 577 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (E.D.Mo.
1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1984). The evidence fails to demonstrate that
[VOL. 74:35
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The homeowner in Criger was fortunate that the court framed the
issue as one involving the application of estoppel to the homeowner,
rather than as one requiring the homeowner to prove FEMA was
estopped to assert the understated proof of loss. Estoppel is difficult to
prove against the government.
The law of estoppel against the federal government is complex.
While some cases have protected the insured's right to assert estoppel,
holding that estoppel can be asserted even against the United States
where justice and fair play require it,31 (a court has held, for example,
that partial payments by FEMA support an insured's claim that FEMA
should not later be allowed to raise defects in the proof of loss),32 many
cases make it very difficult for plaintiffs to assert estoppel against the
federal government. In Wagner v. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 33 the Ninth Circuit held that a party seeking to raise estoppel
against the government must establish affirmative misconduct going
beyond mere negligence. 34 Even then, estoppel will only apply where
the government's wrongful conduct will cause a serious injustice and the
public's interest will not suffer.35 In Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond, the Supreme Court said that litigants may not use the doctrine
of estoppel offensively to support "a claim for payment of money from
the Public Treasury contrary to a statutory appropriation." 36
Estoppel, of course, will always depend on the facts of any particu-
lar case, but counsel should be aware of the type of problems that can
arise when the federal government is behind the insurance.
IV. PRIVILEGED LITIGANT
The common theme to the problems for insureds under flood
insurance policies issued (or reinsured) by the federal government
relates to the federal government's status as a privileged litigant in its
own courts. The doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and immunity can cause
problems for a plaintiff suing the federal government that do not exist in
cases against private insurers in state courts.
the government relied upon the claim form to its detriment. Defendant never paid
plaintiff the $3,721.06, and thus, suffered no injury. Prejudice in some tangible
form is an essential element of an equitable estopped claim. Old Republic Ins. Co.
v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 943, 947 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1986).
Id.
3 1. Bolton v. Giuffrida, 569 F. Supp. 30, 33 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (imposing estoppel against FEMA to
raise defects in a flood insurance proof of loss).
32. Meister Bros. Inc. v. Macy, 674 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1982).
33. 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988).
34. Wagner v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 847 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1988).
35. Id.
36. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmon, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990).
1998]
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Another problem is the paucity of federal insurance decisions.
Most insurance disputes are fought in state courts. Consequently, a rich-
er body of citable authority exists in the state courts. Perhaps realizing
this, federal courts have developed a rule that if no statutory or deci-
sional federal law exists, the courts may draw upon "standard insurance
law principles." 37
The Court in Brazil v. Giuffrida said:
In creating the [Flood Insurance] Program, Congress did not
intend to abrogate standard insurance law principles. Thus, we
hold that federal law controls the interpretation of the policy in
issue, recognizing that neither the statutory nor decisional law
of any particular state is controlling, but that we shall apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision by drawing
upon standard insurance law principles. 38
Another way for a lawyer to invoke state law is to assert that the suit
pertains to the handling of the claim. One court has held that even
though federal law governs the interpretation of the flood insurance
policy, state law provides the rule of decision in cases involving claims
handling. 39 With respect to claims handling, state law requires only that
insureds give a proof of loss based on the best evidence available to them
at the time. Only willful misstatements in the proof of loss will permit
the insurer to avoid liability under the policy. 40 Recognizing that
insureds can hardly be expected to know as much about the law of
insurance coverage as insurance companies, state law imposes on insur-
ance companies a duty to properly investigate insurance claims to
determine if the insurance company might owe more than the insured
realizes.4 1
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Most of the problems discussed apply to flood insurance policies
whether issued by FEMA or WYO insurers. Some additional problems
arise in litigation under flood policies issued by FEMA that do not apply
37. Dixie Warehouse v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 547 F. Supp. 81, 83
(M.D.N.C. 1982).
38. Brazil v. Giuffrida, 763 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing West v. Harris, 573 F.2d 873
(5th Cir. 1978) (citations and quotations omitted)).
39. Zumbrun v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 719 F. Supp. 890, 894 (E.D. Cal. 1989); Giuffrida, 763
F.2d at 1075.
40. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, § 12.06 at 12-20 (Matthew Bender 1993).
41. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 451 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
[VOL. 74:35
FLOOD INSURANCE IS NOT ALL CREATED EQUAL
to policies issued by WYO insurers. For example, a significant disadvan-
tage to suing FEMA, as opposed to a WYO insurer, is that punitive
damages probably are not available.
The United States Code provides: "The United States ... shall not
be liable... for punitive damages."42 No reported cases apply this rule
to FEMA, but other cases have applied it to federal agencies such as the
Small Business Administration43 and the United States Postal Service. 44
Private insurers, of course, are liable for punitive damages. This
leads to the result that a homeowner can seek punitive damages for
misconduct against a WYO but probably not against FEMA-even when
both entities have issued identical flood insurance policies and may have
committed the same egregious acts. FEMA is liable for breaching the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but this requires the
homeowner-plaintiff to comply with the Federal Tort Claims Act. 45
In Latz v. Gallagher4 6 the claimants filed an insurance claim to be
reimbursed for the cost of moving their home due to an erosion
problem; FEMA denied it.47 The claimants then sued FEMA for breach
of contract and for tort damages of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and intentional or negligent misrepresentation. 48 The court held
that filing an insurance claim did not permit the claimants to sue for the
tort damages, too. 49 The claimants had not complied with the require-
ments of filing an administrative claim first.50 The court held that the
insurance claim did not give adequate notice of the tort claims.5' The
claimants had not given the agency written notice of the claim sufficient
to enable the agency to investigate and had not placed a value on the
claim.5 2  The court held that "there are certain jurisdictional pre-
requisites with which the plaintiffs must without exception comply." 53
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1993).
43. Small Bus. Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1989). The Small Business Administra-
tion violated a provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 166. A trial court awarded punitive damages
to the plaintiffs. Id. The Eighth Circuit overturned the award for punitive damages, ruling "[w]e
reverse the court's award of punitive damages as barred by the government's sovereign immunity."
Id. at 170.
44. Hassan v. United States Postal Serv., 842 F.2d 260 (1 th Cir. 1988). A postal truck struck the
plaintiff's vehicle. Id. at 261. The court held that the trial court should "assess damages under the
Federal Torts Claims Act pursuant to the law of the state of injury---except to the extent that the state
permits punitive damages." Id. at 262 n.3.
45. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.
46. 562 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
47. Latz v. Gallagher, 562 F. Supp. 690, 691 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 693.
50. See id. at 692-93.
51. Id. at 693.
52. Id. at 692.
53. Id.
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The Federal Tort Claims Act imposes additional procedural require-
ments on the homeowner-plaintiff and short deadlines which, if missed,
can defeat legitimate claims. 54 Also, in litigation against FEMA, the
homeowner-plaintiff may not have a right to insist upon a jury trial. 55
The plaintiff probably can recover attorneys' fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act. 56 Another quirk arises from a decision that held
the homeowner-plaintiff may not be able to sue FEMA in federal district
court for breach of the insurance contract. One federal district court
said that breach of contract suits must be brought in (what is now known
as) the United States Court of Federal Claims. 57 The court struck the
cause of action for breach of contract. 58
This ruling might seem to contradict the statutory requirement that
lawsuits pertaining to flood insurance policies must be brought in federal
district court. To avoid this contradiction, counsel can style the cause of
action as one for "Claim for Breach of Insurance Policy Under Section
4053 (or Section 4072)."59 Section 4053 permits suits against Write-
Your-Own insurers (for example, private insurers who issue flood
insurance). 60 Section 4072 permits suits against FEMA.61 Technically,
the plaintiff is not suing for breach of contract but rather making a claim
specifically authorized by the National Flood Insurance Act.62
VI. WORTH PURSUING
Despite these procedural difficulties, insurance coverage for flood
and landslide losses is worth pursuing because it can be significant,
especially in light of the "constructive total loss" doctrine of insurance
law. If a flood condition is repeating and continuing such that a house
likely will be destroyed eventually, the house is a constructive total loss.
When a constructive total loss of the property has occurred, some states
allow a homeowner to recover the full cost of eliminating the flood
hazard or replacing the lost dwelling (up to the limits of the insurance
policy).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1990); see also Johnson v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir.
1996) (setting out a two year statute of limitations for Federal Tort Claims Act claims).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
57. Latz v. Gallegher, 562 F. Supp. 690, 692 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
58. Id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4053.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 4072
62. Id. § 4001.
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With respect to flood insurance, the authority is Gibson v. HUD.63
The Gibson's owned a home covered by a flood insurance policy on the
bank of a creek. 64 The creek flooded, creating for one week an island
on which their home rested.65 The "gut" between their home and the
new bank of the creek remained after the water subsided. 66 This gut
filled with water three to five times a year, subjecting their home to an
increased risk of flood damage. 67 According to an agreed statement of
facts, the cost to repair the home after the flooding was $10,390.68
However, the cost to replace the house (including relocating the second
story) at another, safer location was $29,932.03.69
The flood insurer took the position that it was only required to pay
to repair the home in the danger zone. 70 The homeowners contended
that they were entitled to the cost of relocating to safer ground. 71 The
court agreed, rejecting the flood insurer's argument that it need only
pay for repairs to the existing home. 72 The Gibson's recovered the full
cost of securing replacement premises elsewhere. 73
Standard state law insurance principles applicable to homeowner's
insurance are in accord with the rule in Gibson.74 Counsel representing
homeowners with flood insurance claims must be aware of the need to
conduct a sufficient hydrological or geo-technical investigation into the
flooding or mudflow incident to know the full extent of the client's
claim. Counsel must look not only to the cause of the flooding or
mudflow (to determine if homeowner's insurance might cover part of
the loss) but also the scope of the future flooding or mudflow (to
determine if the client's losses are greater than simply the cost to repair
the damage).
63. Gibson v. HUD, 479 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1978). The defendant in Gibson was the Secretary
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who at that time administered the
federal flood insurance program. Id. The duties of the Secretary have since been transferred to the
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. See Meister Bros. Inc. v. Macy, 674 F.2d
1174, 1175 n.1 (1982). From June 6, 1969 to Dec. 31, 1977, the program was administered by the
National Flood Insurers Association, an unincorporated association of insurance carriers under a
contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. Effective Jan. 1, 1978, HUD
took over administration of the program. Id. By executive order on April 1, 1979, FEMA assumed
responsibility for administering the program. Id.
64. Gibson, 479 F. Supp. at 4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id.
74. See Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962); Strickland
v. Federal Ins. Co., 246 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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Flood insurance can offer much relief to devastated homeowners.
Flood insurance policyholders who fail to complete the obstacle course
of procedural requirements, however, should expect no pity from
FEMA-nor from the federal courts.
